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A Critique of  Antiphon’s Justice through 
the Lens of  Socrates’ Position on Nomoi 
and Phusis
Mohammed Hossain
In Plato’s Crito, Antiphon and Socrates provide interesting perspectives on life, justice, and the relationship between laws and members of a so-
ciety. Both discuss a seemingly opposing relationship 
between laws that are written to govern a society and 
the fundamental nature of people who are not in-
clined to follow these laws. A distinction is drawn 
between what Antiphon dubs nomoi and phusis. 
Nomoi represents laws that are made by individuals 
of a society in order to establish social order. They are 
made by mutual agreements between people to set 
limitations on conduct. Phusis, on the other hand, 
represents the natural order of the world and how 
people function naturally. Although Socrates does 
not explicitly use Antiphon’s language, he certainly 
seems to develop arguments about the nature of peo-
ple, laws created by individuals, and the criteria for a 
good and just life. Overall, it is Socrates who provides 
a better justification for the employment of nomoi in 
living a good and just life. He posits a better method 
for allowing members of a society to coexist with each 
other while discouraging the possibility of acting un-
justly and harming one another. Socrates’ account 
provides a more plausible argument for a good life as 
opposed to merely accounting for a free life with the 
possibility of acting unjustly. In order to fully explain 
this conclusion, I will discuss essential qualities of 
nomoi and phusis, then discuss arguments provided 
by both Antiphon and Socrates with regard to the 
relationship between the two laws.
Fragments from Antiphon’s writing suggest that 
nomoi is fundamentally different from phusis in 
both origin and application. Nomoi are described as 
“products of agreement, not of natural growth” and 
“extra additions,” while phusis is juxtaposed as “prod-
ucts of natural growth, not agreement” and “neces-
sary” (Antiphon, 2011, p. 156). In other words, 
nomoi is a result of conventions and parameters cre-
ated by individuals, while phusis is intrinsic to the 
nature of the individuals themselves. In terms of their 
application, nomoi is treated as “important in the 
presence of witnesses,” while phusis is “treated as im-
portant while alone and with no witnesses present” 
(Antiphon, 2011, p. 155). Under nomoi, individuals 
are “free from penalty” if crimes are not noticed (if 
they are noticed then crimes are punishable under 
the law), while phusis is unaffected by observation. 
The reason for this is that disputes cannot be easily 
settled by the law if testimony is not provided by any-
one other than the accuser and the accused; hence, 
the presence of witnesses becomes important in order 
to make one case more persuasive than another in 
court. From these competing testimonies, justice is 
ABsTRAcT
 Inquiries on justice, law, and natural order can often incite interesting debate and discussion. Questions such 
as “what is justice” and “what is the role of law and natural order in relation to justice” are among these in-
quiries. Although they can have many implications for contemporary issues, these inquiries are certainly not 
just modern problems by any means. In fact, these are fundamental questions about society that have been 
posed since the days of Plato, Socrates, and pre-Socratic philosophers of Ancient Greece. Antiphon and Plato, 
in particular, have interesting views on natural order and law, and they both offer opposing perspectives. I will 
elaborate on both of their arguments about justice with respect t o its relationship to the law and natural order, 
as well as justify my position in support of Plato’s view—that Antiphon’s justice does not lead to a good life. 
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maintained by making punishments and amends ac-
cordingly. On the other hand, phusis is unaffected by 
the presence of witnesses because it functions on the 
will of an individual alone. According to phusis, peo-
ple should be able to do what they wish, and if they 
are truly just then they will not do harm to another 
individual. The harm is not decided by testimony in 
court, but rather by the circumstances and will of the 
individuals involved. This is why it is said that under 
phusis, people are only harmed “as a result of truth” 
(Antiphon, 2011, p. 156). The nature of nomoi is to 
set bonds on phusis. If phusis functions under the 
utility of life, then nomoi is a restriction on that util-
ity in order to establish social order. 
Moreover, Antiphon claims that we live from what is 
advantageous and die from what is not advantageous, 
but the advantage of nomoi is simply generated from 
bonds on phusis—this is perhaps where Antiphon 
begins to move away from a semantic explanation 
of nomoi and phusis and shifts towards developing 
arguments concerning the importance of phusis in 
living a good and just life. The advantages of nomoi 
that establish social regularity (namely, creating laws 
against theft, misdemeanor, violence, etc.) are only 
possible by limiting the freedom of human nature 
which often functions contrary to these bonds. A 
problem arises, however, when assuming that nomoi 
prevents harms from being inflicted on members of 
a society. Although it may seem like laws can prevent 
crime, upon inspection, nomoi does not prevent the 
cause of harm, but merely provides the possibility of 
punishment and recourse towards a crime inflicted. 
As Antiphon (2011) puts it:
…justice that stems from nomoi is insuf-
ficient to aid those who submit. In the 
first place, it permits the one who suf-
fers to suffer and the wrongdoer to do 
wrong, and it was not at the time of the 
wrongdoing able to prevent either the 
sufferer from suffering or the wrongdoer 
from doing wrong. And when the case is 
brought to trial for punishment, there is 
no special advantage for the one who has 
suffered and that he is able to exact the 
penalty. And it is open to the wrongdoer 
to deny it…. However convincing the ac-
cusation is on behalf of the accuser, the 
defense can be just as convincing. For 
victory comes through speech (p. 157).  
To illustrate this concept, if a business were to be 
robbed of its merchandise, nomoi could not stop the 
crime from actually occurring but merely punish the 
thief and assist the victim. For this reason, it is argued 
by Antiphon that nomoi is not truly advantageous; 
it does not prevent harm or cause benefit. Further-
more, punishment for the criminal and recourse for 
the victim are not guaranteed. They are largely de-
pendent on the persuasiveness of arguments present-
ed in court and not the truth. In this sense, it may be 
reasonable to see how nomoi fails to bring a good and 
just life to anyone in a society.
Socrates offers a very different view than Antiphon 
on nomoi and phusis, starting with a disagreement 
on Antiphon’s notion of an advantageous life. As 
stated before, Antiphon asserts that phusis should be 
preferred over nomoi due to the fact that nomoi does 
not give one an advantageous life and phusis gives 
one access to the full utility of one’s life. In direct op-
position Plato’s (2002) character Socrates states that 
the “…important thing is not life, but the good life” 
(p. 48). This statement implies that a good life is one 
in which individuals do not harm each other because 
“doing people harm is no different from wrongdo-
ing” (Plato, 2002, p. 49). In other words, living a 
good life is distinct from merely living life as a util-
ity, and the distinction stems from the unwillingness 
of an individual to harm others. This starting point 
is crucial for understanding why Socrates provides a 
better justification for the employment of nomoi in 
living a good and just life. By breaking bonds made 
with nomoi, an individual cannot live a just life be-
cause he is doing harm to the city itself. As Socrates 
puts it, a city can be destroyed if “…its courts have no 
force” and if laws are “…nullified and set at naught 
by private individuals” (Plato, 2002, p. 50). Socie-
ties can be destroyed if individuals choose to ignore 
nomoi and purely follow phusis, which is not just or 
good in any way. Furthermore, Socrates may disagree 
with Antiphon’s belief that there are no advantages 
to a life led by nomoi. He cites numerous examples 
of advantages that Athens had provided him, such as 
the marriage of his parents leading to his birth and 
his education. Socrates states: “It is impious to bring 
violence to bear against your mother or father; it is 
much more so to use it against your country,” imply-
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ing that every person has a duty to the well-being of 
their state, and any actions that prove contrary would 
be impious, harmful, and ultimately unjust as well 
(Plato, 2002, p. 51).  Finally, he answers Antiphon’s 
argument concerning nomoi “binding” phusis by 
stating these duties one has (to their state) do not 
bind or enslave people because they have the option 
to either leave the state (through exile) or accept its 
terms.
In sum, Socrates provides a more plausible account of 
living a good and just life by first arguing that a good 
life is more important than living one free of nomoi 
and then demonstrating how nomoi fulfills the nec-
essary criteria for providing one with a good life, 
while phusis lacks in this respect. Antiphon’s notion 
of justice is one in which phusis is used to live one’s 
life to its fullest utility, but taking Socrates’ account 
of justice may prove this idea to be problematic. An-
tiphon’s notion of justice does not practically prevent 
individuals in a society from inflicting harm upon 
each other; full utility of one’s actions implies pos-
sessing the autonomy to do harm. This is not justice, 
at least when considering Socrates’ notion of good-
ness. In order to promote a good and just life, there 
must be parameters established in order to prevent 
people from harming each other. Perhaps one could 
argue that locking up all the citizens of a society in 
isolated jail cells would prevent harm, but paradoxi-
cally, this is would be very far from a just society. The 
next best option, then, is to set rules and limitations 
on the population, which may be enforced through 
a series of punishments used to discourage socially 
unacceptable actions through nomoi. The key notion 
that Antiphon seems to skim over in his criticism of 
nomoi is the utility of the laws to act as a practical 
deterrent of harmful actions. This can be seen as So-
crates’ answer to Antiphon’s major criticism of nomoi 
(that it does not prevent harm but only punishes af-
ter the fact, resulting in no advantage): that it should 
not only serve as a guideline delivering judgments in 
court, but also guide our daily actions in order to 
have everyone within a state function accordingly. 
The result advances the good of everyone in the state 
as a whole, which is ultimately how a just state and 
its individuals should function.
For argument’s sake, let us suppose that Antiphon 
may have considered that laws act as a deterrent. Giv-
en his previous position in support of phusis, perhaps 
he would argue that some people have a natural in-
clination to break laws because they are contrary by 
their nature, and therefore, adopting civility on the 
basis of phusis might be more desirable. I believe that 
an answer to this issue may simply be that Socrates 
knew this to be true at times and supported nomoi 
for this very reason. If people naturally possess an in-
clination to act contrarily to the benefit of a state as 
a whole, then their actions must be limited in order 
to ensure that harm is not done. Such an objection 
would not be problematic for Socrates’ support of 
nomoi. In fact, nomoi can be seen as more meaning-
ful because of the very reason that it acts to limit nat-
ural ways in which people may harm each other. An-
other possible objection to Socrates’ position may be 
that if nomoi is sometimes unjust, then obedience to 
laws becomes unjust. One would then be required to 
act unjustly if obeying the laws of a state, and would 
be punished for acting justly in defiance of the law. 
An example illustrating this argument may ironically 
be Socrates’ unjust conviction. My answer to such a 
scenario would simply be that nomoi is not neces-
sarily a static set of rules, but can change and adapt 
to circumstances based upon the will of members of 
the society that establish laws; therefore, such unjust 
nomoi would eventually change to become just. For 
example, if an individual was convicted of a crime 
under an unjust law, nomoi would dictate that this 
individual would be sent to a court to be judged by 
members of the society (the judge, jury, etc.). If a 
compelling argument is made that the law does not 
represent the values of a good and just society, then 
the court could plausibly rule to change the laws it-
self and free the convicted man. Practical examples of 
this would be many Supreme Court decisions (such 
as Brown v. Board of Education and Plessy v. Ferguson), 
which have been used to overrule previous laws that 
were unjust. In sum, the dynamic nature of nomoi 
would mean that unjust laws would eventually come 
to change. 
Considering the situation that Socrates was in (being 
sent to his death due to a false conviction), it would 
have been understandable for him to agree with An-
tiphon. After all, if justice had functioned flawlessly 
under nomoi, he would not have been charged with 
impiety or corrupting the youth. Nonetheless, So-
crates fulfilled his duty as a citizen of Athens by refus-
ing to run away and drinking the hemlock tea. Per-
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haps Socrates realized that although justice is often 
difficult to define, we should not be hasty to assume 
that there is something fundamentally problematic 
with the idea of agreed limitations on conduct, espe-
cially if it is advantageous for the whole of a society. 
Instead, we should work to have truth reveal itself 
through discussion and argumentation in court, just 
as many philosophers do through dialogue and aca-
demic disagreement.
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